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Abstract
This paper examines whether investor mood, driven by World Health Organization
(WHO) alerts and media institutional news on globally dangerous diseases, is priced in
pharmaceutical companies’ stocks in the United States. We concentrate on irrational
investors who buy and sell pharmaceutical companies’ stocks guided by beliefs as op-
posed to rational expectations. We argue that disease-related news (DRNs) should not
trigger rational trading. We find that DRNs have a positive and significant sentiment
effect among investors (in Wall Street). The effect is stronger (weaker) for small (large)
companies, who are less (more) likely to engage in the development of new vaccines in
the wake of DRNs. A potential negative mood (in Main Street) – induced by disease-
related fear – does not alter the positive sentiment effect. Our findings give rise to
profitable trading strategies leading to significantly positive performances. Overall,
this unparalleled research shows that large events of devastating nature to the econ-
omy can be considered as good news to some groups of interest, such as stock market
traders.
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1 Introduction
A relatively large number of studies shows that sentiment may drive agents’ investment de-
cisions (see, among others, De Long et al., 1990; Cen and Liyan-Yang, 2013; Kaplanski and
Levy, 2015). In this respect, the behavioral finance literature provides solid evidence sup-
porting the existence of a significant relation between stock returns and investor sentiment.1
Investor sentiment is typically defined as a belief about future cash flows and investment
risks that is not justified by the facts at hand (see Baker and Wurgler (2007), pp. 129).
Certain events may create either a positive or a negative sentiment that strongly affects
investors’ investment decisions and, thus, the corresponding stock market prices.
Early studies observe, for example, that sunshine, which is well known to be a driver
of peoples’ mood, tends to comove positively with daily stock returns (see Saunders, 1993;
Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003). Yuan et al. (2006) find that lunar phases may affect stock
market returns. More recent studies find that international sporting games – and in partic-
ular soccer games – heavily affect investors’ sentiment, and in turn, stock market returns
(see Edmans et al., 2007; Kaplanski and Levy, 2010a). Kaplanski and Levy (2010b) show
that major aviation disasters tend to generate a negative sentiment within two days after
the event. Horva´th and Huizinga (2015) examine the impact of the announcement on the
creation of the European Financial Stability Facility on bank share prices.
Key in this research is the possibility – hitherto unaccounted for by existing literature
– that large events of devastating nature to the economy and society can be regarded as
good news to some groups of interest, such as stock market investors. Differently from
the existing works, we rely on globally dangerous diseases (i.e., SARS, Influenza A(H1N1),
Polio, Ebola), which are perceived by the general public (Main Street) as large negative
developments, but can generate sector-specific positive investor sentiment (Wall Street).
Specifically, our main contribution consists of employing a novel mood variable (hereinafter
disease-related news or DRNs), based on World Health Organization’s alerts and media
news related to globally dangerous diseases, to examine the effect of investor sentiment on
1See, among others, Saunders (1993); Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003); Kamstra et al. (2003); Loughran
and Schultz (2004); Cao and Wei (2005); Baker and Wurgler (2006); Edmans et al. (2007); Kaplanski and
Levy (2010a,b); Curatola et al. (2016)
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pharmaceutical stock prices. Our principal hypothesis here is that fear of globally dangerous
diseases will be negatively associated with investor pessimism, whereas DRNs will positively
affect investment in pharmaceutical stocks. This hypothesis builds on the argument that –
while globally dangerous diseases spread fear and generate negative sentiment – investors
unrealistically anticipate an increase in cash flows of pharmaceutical companies due to selling
new medicines aimed at fighting the new pandemic disease.
Thus, investor sentiment about the performance of pharmaceutical companies may be
one key element that drives financial investment decisions. This notwithstanding, there is a
dearth of research into pharmaceutical companies’ stock market performance (see Himmel-
mann and Schiereck, 2012; Theodossiou and Theodossiou, 2014).
To the best of our knowledge, the relation between pharmaceutical stock returns and
investor sentiment – driven by DRNs – has not been investigated in the literature, with the
exception of Huberman and Regev (2001). Huberman and Regev (2001) use a case study to
investigate the effect of investor enthusiasm to a major breakthrough in cancer research. In-
terestingly, the stock price of EntreMed, a bio-pharmaceutical company, responded stronger
to the breakthrough five months later, when it was reported in the popular press, than when
it was originally announced in Nature. Nevertheless, their research neither (i) generalizes to
the whole pharmaceutical industry, nor (ii) studies investor sentiment effect on stock prices
and returns, nor (iii) designs global disease-news-induced trading strategies.
The main contribution of this study is to evaluate the balance between two contrasting
effects of outbreaks of globally dangerous diseases. On the one hand, we recognize the
possibility that pandemic diseases spread fear among the general public and stock market
investors, which triggers a negative (fear-induced) sentiment in pharmaceutical stock prices.
On the other hand, an outbreak of a pandemic disease is expected to have a positive sector-
specific sentiment effect on pharmaceutical stock prices. Methodologically, accounting for
the two competing (negative and positive) effects manifests in a unique framework that
alleviates the possibility of spurious correlations. In more detail, this study addresses the
following questions, hitherto unedited in the context of pharmaceutical stock market. First,
does investors’ fear gauge, which is provoked by DRNs, lead to a decrease in pharmaceutical
stock market returns? Second, does an outbreak of a globally dangerous disease trigger a
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positive sector-specific investor sentiment effect on pharmaceutical stock prices? Third, does
investor sentiment (optimism or pessimism) about future performance of pharmaceutical
companies persist over time? Fourth, do stock prices of large pharmaceutical stocks respond
to DRNs differently than stock prices of small pharmaceutical stocks?
To address these issues, we use stock prices of 102 pharmaceutical firms listed in the
United States to construct four different investment portfolios. In addition, as robustness
check, we consider the S&P500 Information Technology stock index. Our empirical strategy
draws upon two commonly used – event-study and regression-based – methodologies to
evaluate the investor sentiment effect on stock prices of pharmaceutical firms following a
DRN.
We identify a significantly positive and persistent investor sentiment – following DRNs
– in stock returns of pharmaceutical companies. This may be generated by positive beliefs
about R&D investments in the aftermath of disease outbreaks. Notice also that the persis-
tence of investor sentiment may be reflected in information salience (Palomino et al., 2009).
Furthermore, we construct a fear gauge index by employing the stock market volatility index
VIX as a proxy for investor fear. The index always exerts a negative and significant effect
on returns of pharmaceutical companies’ stocks. We find that sentiment tends to exert a
stronger effect on small firms than on large firms. This finding is along the lines of Qiu and
Welch (2004) who observe that, under certain conditions, small firm returns become a proxy
for investor sentiment (see also Edmans et al., 2007; Baker and Wurgler, 2006). Importantly,
our results are supported by a battery of robustness checks.
Overall, our findings give rise to profitable trading strategies where an investor takes a
long-position in a portfolio of pharmaceutical stocks and a short one in the stock market
volatility index (i.e., VIX). We stress that these strategies lead to a significant positive
performance.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide the back-
ground and motivation to the study. In Section 3, we describe our mood variable DRN and
report descriptive statistics. In Section 4, we outline the methodology and formulate our
main hypotheses. In Section 5, we discuss the estimation results. In Section 6, we design
hypothetical trading strategies. Finally, in Section 7, we provide some concluding remarks
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and we also shed light on the practical usefulness of our results.
2 Motivation and Background
2.1 Investor Sentiment and Media Coverage: The Case of Pan-
demic Diseases
Mood and anxiety in the stock market – coined as investor sentiment – are documented in
asset pricing literature to have a significant impact on stock market returns.2 Mehra and Sah
(2002) relate in a theoretical framework the effect of feelings on investors’ decision making
in financial markets. Nofsinger (2005) finds that interpersonal communication, leading to
“social mood”, translates into emotions such as optimism, pessimism, happiness, or anxiety.
A general finding is that fear leads to negative asset returns while positive emotions increase
investors’ willingness to take risks.
In this study, we hypothesize that increased media coverage of globally dangerous dis-
eases has a positive and relatively persistent effect on pharmaceutical companies. Despite the
overall negative sentiment in the population due to fear of being infected, public and politi-
cal demand for containing a global epidemic disease can lead to additional income channels
for pharmaceutical companies. Typical reactions to an infectious illness include higher R&D
investment (partially subsidized by the government), vaccine mass orders, or general increase
in demand for preventive measures (e.g., medicine, disinfection agents, surgical masks). We
focus on four major diseases that were regarded as a Public Health Emergency of Interna-
tional Concern (PHEIC) by the WHO. The outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) in 2003, Influenza A(H1N1) in 2009, and Polio and Ebola in 2014 were all more or
less intensively covered by media.
The role of mass media in communication of risks has been subject to intense debate.
It is argued that low-probability, high-consequence events, such as health risks associated
with outbreaks of rare diseases, are overemphasized in media-generated news waves. This
2In the literature, a variety of mood variables was considered. For instance, weather conditions (Saunders,
1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003), hours of daylight in fall and winter (Kamstra et al., 2003), international
soccer results (Edmans et al., 2007; Kaplanski and Levy, 2010a; Curatola et al., 2016), negative newspaper
articles (Tetlock, 2007).
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unbalanced reporting leads to a disjunction between actual and population’s perceived risk
(see Vasterman et al., 2005; Mairal, 2011; Young et al., 2013).3 Public overreaction and
panic can also lead to adverse economic effects. In particular, sectors such as tourism or
retail sales fall due to individuals’ preventive measures, such as reduction in traveling to the
affected geographical areas or avoidance of public places.4
In the spirit of Kaplanski and Levy (2010b), we search for media articles related to glob-
ally dangerous diseases in order to (i) gain better understanding of the scale and timing of
the information salience of such diseases and (ii) to evaluate the importance of the infor-
mation salience as a potential source of investor sentiment in the pharmaceutical industry.
Figure 1 illustrates the normalized number of media news informing the general public about
the outbreak and acceleration for the aforementioned pandemic diseases. It is evident from
Figure 1 that the frequency of the relevant news notably increases on the announcement day
(t = 0), that is, when the official WHO PHEIC statement is made. The news coverage inten-
sifies and attains maximum on the third day after the official WHO PHEIC announcement.
In addition, the absolute number of news remains above the average up to six days after
the announcement. This is not surprising since PHEIC statements are followed by other
official/institutional news, which will be used to build our event-day mood variable in the
next section. Specifically, in two out of four cases an event (i.e., DRNs) was taking place
on any of the seven days following a PHEIC announcement. These observations provide
support for the existence of a relative strong relationship between official news and media
coverage and therefore between DRNs and investor sentiment. Moreover, they suggest that
such sentiment effect lasts for several days supporting the persistent sentiment hypothesis
that will be formulated in Section 4.
3For instance, a representative survey conducted by Blendon et al. (2004) indicates that 69% of respon-
dents living in Ontario, 57% in Canada excluding Ontario and 32% in the United States were concerned
about contracting SARS. Whereas, educative and informative communication to the public in Singapore re-
sulted in a much lower overall anxiety level. Quah and Hin-Peng (2004) report that only 14% of respondents
viewed SARS as a personal risk in May 2003.
4In case of SARS, Hanna and Yiping (2004) estimate the total cost at about 0.5% of GDP in China,
while Keogh-Brown and Smith (2008) assess the global economic impact between USD 30 and 100bn. Using
a general equilibrium model for the UK, Smith et al. (2009) estimate costs related to Influenza A(H1N1)
between 0.5% and 1.0% of UK’s GDP. However, the total economic burden is difficult to quantify since both
direct health care costs as well as indirect costs of work absenteeism and loss of productivity have to be
taken into account.
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Figure 1: Media Coverage around PHEIC alerts on Globally Dangerous Diseases
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Notes: This figure depicts the normalized number of distinct, disease-related newspaper articles published in the United States
around the event days. The event dates (t = 0) are considered to be the official PHEIC statements. The number of articles
relies on all four disease announcements and is normalized relative to the its peak value over the 19 days period. The dotted
line represents the average relative value across the 19 days period. Red points illustrate the absolute number of disease-related
newspaper articles. Data are obtained using the LexisNexis database for global news and business information.
2.2 The Pharmaceutical Industry
The pharmaceutical industry is at the heart of the US economy. Although public and private
spending on pharmaceuticals in the US collectively contributed just over 2% (around USD
1,000) to the country’s GDP per capita in 2011 (OECD, 2013),5 this share was the largest
among the OECD countries. In 2009, the overall US health care expenditure accounted for
18% of the country’s GDP, but it is estimated to contribute 37% in 2050.6 Furthermore,
biopharmaceutical companies in the US account for the largest share of all US companies’
R&D expenditure, which represents nearly 20% of all domestic R&D (PhRMA, 2015).7 This
is one of the fastest growing industries. Indeed, both revenues and R&D spending by the
US biopharmaceutical industry tripled from 1996 to 2008 (Lazonick and Tulum, 2011). Fur-
5Source: OECD Health Statistics (2013).
6Source: The Statistics Portal (Statista), 2015 (available at www.statista.com/statistics/215163/us-
health-expenditure-as-percentage-of-gdp-forecast).
7Source: The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) (available at
www.phrma.org/economic-impact).
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ther, Offit (2005) documents an increase in market concentration of vaccine producers in the
US over past decades. Specifically, there are currently only four FDA-approved US-based
publicly-traded vaccine producers and distributors.8 The reasons for companies undertak-
ing or quitting vaccine production are multi-fold. On the one hand, research, development,
testing, and manufacturing of vaccines are costly; on the other hand, the market for selling
vaccines is smaller than the market for pharmaceutical drugs, to name just few reasons. How-
ever, high entry barriers for the development of a new vaccine bears potential for monopoly.
Additionally, there is no manufacturing of generic vaccines, as vaccine production is substan-
tially more complicated and technologically advanced than drug production. A generic drug
is defined by the WHO as “a pharmaceutical product, usually intended to be interchange-
able with an innovator product, that is manufactured without a licence from the innovator
company and marketed after the expiry date of the patent or other exclusive rights”9. The
result is an increase in vaccine shortages, especially for flu vaccines (Hinman et al., 2006).
The emergence of a globally dangerous disease can thus be regarded as a potentially new
market for vaccine producers along with subsidized R&D. Therefore, it is surprising that re-
search focusing on the effects of investors’ sentiments on the stock prices of pharmaceutical
companies has been underwhelming.
2.3 The US Stock Market and Investor Attention to Pharma-
Stocks
This empirical study focuses on the US stock market. There are two main reasons to select the
US stock market for this study: (1) it is one of the most closely followed markets in the world
and, as such, very efficient with respect to new information as well as one of the most liquid
(see, among others, Kaplanski and Levy, 2010a); (2) the US stock market is one of the leading
stock markets in the world and accounts for about 40% of the global market (Hou et al.,
2011).10 Our study is further motivated by a growing role of pharmaceutical companies’
8FDA’s “Complete List of Vaccines Licensed for Immunization and Distribution in the
US” includes Emergent Biosolutions, Johnson & Johnson, Merck and Pfizer (available at
www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Vaccines/ApprovedProducts/ucm093833.htm).
9www.who.int/trade/glossary/story034/en/
10Notice that the average stocks traded (as % of GDP) in the US over the last decade is above 200%
(Source: World Development Indicators).
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stocks within the industry of financial services in the US. Perceptive Life Sciences Offsh
Fund LTD (USD 859M), Traxis Sivik Global Healthcare Offshore (USD 44M), and Visium
Balanced Offshore Fund CL2 (USD 3697M) are examples of the sector-specific equity funds
investing exclusively in bio-pharmaceutical stocks.11 There is also a large number of funds
with significant exposures to stocks of (main) individual pharmaceutical companies. Indeed,
Table 1 indicates that, as of second quarter of 2014, institutional investors hold significant
positions in largest pharmaceutical firms’ stocks, including Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, Merck
& Company, AstraZeneca, Amgen and Gilead Sciences Inc.
Table 1: Institutional Investors’ Positions in (Main) Pharmaceutical Stocks
Pharmaceutical Company Fund (% of pharma stocks held)
Pfizer Jana Partners (0.05%); Fairfax Financial Holdings (0.48%); Orbimed Advisors
(1.42%); Eton Park Capital Management (1.53%), Boyar Asset Management (3.94%);
York Capital Management Global Advisors (1.35%); Farallon Capital Management
(0.43%), Muhlenkamp and Co (0.21%)
Johnson & Johnson Berkshire Hathaway (0.03%); Fairfax Financial Holdings (0.61%); Perry Corp
(0.99%); Orbimed Advisors (0.59%); Boyar Asset Management (2.14%);
Glaxo Chou Associates Management (0.14%);
Merck & Company Fairfax Financial Holdings (0.05%); Orbimed Advisors (1.72%); Healthcor Manage-
ment (1.69%); Vertex One Asset Management (0.67%); Sarissa Capital (7.87%);
Abbott Laboratories Southeastern Asset Management (27, 2.98%);
AstraZeneca Chou Associates Management (0.28%); Third Point (0.91%), Corvex Management
(1.09%); Duquesne Family Office (1.11%); Highfields Capital Management (0.76%);
York Capital Management Global Advisors (1.20%)
Amgen Third Point (0.65%); Orbimed Advisors (3.12%); Pennant Capital Management
(0.50%); Highline Capital Management (7.06%); Sarissa Capital (1.81%);
Lilly Eli & Co Highfields Capital Management (2.13%);
Bristol Myers Squibb Co Orbimed Advisors (4.09%); Boyar Asset Management (2.12%); Muhlenkamp and Co
(1.82%)
Gilead Sciences Inc. Baker Bros. Advisors (0.26%); Palo Alto Investors (0.95%); Orbimed Advisors
(3.34%); Pennant Capital Management (3.07%); Argonaut Capital Management
(1.25%); Healthcor Management (2.69%); Parnassus Investments (2.44%); Muh-
lenkamp and Co (2.12%)
Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc Orbimed Advisors (0.59%); Healthcor Management (3.88%);
Novo Nordisk Markel Corp (1.42%)
Source: Form 13F (SEC) - Reports Filed by Institutional Investment Managers
3 Data
3.1 Official Announcements of Globally Dangerous Diseases
The data cover the entire history of global diseases that were considered as PHEICs by the
WHO - a 12-year period, from March 2003 to December 2014. The global diseases period
11Source: HSBC Hedge Weekly n. 28 - Investment Fund Performance Review, July 2014.
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incorporates 146 DRNs, which we consider to be our event days.12 We categorize the events
according to several criteria: WHO Statement, WHO Disease Outbreak News, Approval, Gvt.
Order, Gvt. Order Cancel, Research Funding and Statement. Events that are considered to
be a WHO Statement13 or WHO Disease Outbreak News14 are obtained from the official
website of WHO. All the other events are obtained through a rigorous online search.
WHO statements are official statements communicated to the public with regard to any
new and substantial information related to a certain disease. For instance, on August 8th
2014 the “Statement on the 1st meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee on the 2014
Ebola outbreak in West Africa” informed on the current state of the Ebola disease outbreak.
Additionally, the emergency committee stated that conditions for a PHEIC have been met
and provided advice to address the Ebola outbreak in the affected countries. Typically, the
mass media uses such WHO statements to communicate the news to a greater public.
WHO Disease Outbreak News, on the other hand, are to some extent regular updates on
the current situation and include, for instance, news about first cross-border transmissions
of a disease. In case of the SARS outbreak in 2003, there were periods of daily updates,
while news on the 2009 Influenza A(H1N1) outbreak were covered on a weekly basis. We
recognize that all regularly spaced updates may be anticipated by stock market investors and
may be priced in prior to the actual update. For this reason, our sample of announcements
comprises only those updates that documented first-time cross-border transmissions. Such
strategy helps ensure the independence of subsequent announcements, insofar as cross-border
transmissions of pandemic diseases occur unpredictably. In case of SARS, we observe a rapid
spread across countries within the first two months.15 In total, 29 countries were affected by
the disease. In case of Influenza A(H1N1), the official list counts more than 214 countries
and overseas territories or communities as of August 1st 2010. The disease spreads quickly
and our list includes a sizable number of first cross-border transmission dates (around 50).
12Notice that WHO announcements and disease-based news released on week-end days are assumed to
have an effect on Monday.
13http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/en
14http://www.who.int/csr/don/en
15Occasionally there were false alarms. Some countries were temporarily included and subsequently re-
moved from the list of affected countries (if a SARS outbreak could not be confirmed in retrospect). We
also included such false alarm dates in our analysis since the public is likely to take the information as a fact
without questioning its reliability at the time the news is published.
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For Polio, we abstain from identifying first outbreak dates as there are only ten event dates
in total. Considering Ebola, we count ten cross-border transmissions in total. However, the
disease was still not under control at the time this paper was written.
In addition to WHO statements and WHO Disease Outbreak News, we include release
dates of official statements provided by government ministries and agencies as well as in-
dividual publicly traded companies. Newly developed vaccines are subject to governmental
approval and a positive feedback might have a substantial impact on the share price of the
vaccine producing company as well as on its competitors/followers. We use official press
release dates provided by the website of the US Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) and label them Approval. Please note that this category is only relevant for Influenza
A(H1N1). For SARS and Ebola, vaccines are still in development while potent Polio vaccines
have existed for decades. Gvt. Order and Gvt. Order Cancel refer to government purchases
of vaccine and subsequent cancellations of orders. Again, these dates refer to the Influenza
A(H1N1) outbreak only. In the case of the SARS outbreak, companies were granted research
funding to develop a potent vaccine. We label the official dates of funding announcements
Research Funding. The category Statement subsumes different, potentially influential, state-
ments provided by government officials and companies referring to the current situation with
regard to a disease. All DRNs are classified and summarized in Table A.2.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
The stock market data - end-of-trading-day prices and market values - are retrieved from
Thomson Reuters Datastream. The cross section includes 102 pharmaceutical companies
that are listed either on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or NASDAQ. In addition,
we retrieve the S&P500 Information Technology index. For non-US based companies, we
use the data on American Depository Receipts (ADRs). This gives rise to a 12-year period
with 3097 trading days, from January 2003 to November 2014. To test for the impact of
DRNs on pharmaceutical stock returns, we employ the rates of return on a variety of port-
folios comprising pharmaceutical stocks. Specifically, we construct four benchmark “phar-
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maceutical portfolios”. The first is an equally weighted portfolio (EW).16 The second is a
value-weighted portfolio of all pharmaceutical stocks with time-varying market-value based
weights (VW). The third portfolio is a constant-value-weighted portfolio accounting for the
10 largest pharmaceutical stocks (TOP). The fourth is a constant-value-weighted portfolio
of 10 smallest pharmaceutical stocks (BOTTOM). The value-weighted portfolio emphasizes
the role of large companies as opposed to small companies. The TOP portfolio illustrates a
real-world situation where investors are constrained by cardinality constraints. The BOT-
TOM portfolio addresses our Hypothesis 4 stated in the next section. Finally, the inclusion
of S&P500 Information Technology – a standardized and tradable diversified portfolio of
stocks – seeks to project our hypotheses on sectors other than the pharmaceutical. In doing
so, we show that the DRN positive sentiment spreads to other sectors and confirm that the
breadth of sentiment is not confined to the pharmaceutical industry only.
We then compute continuously-compounded day-to-day percentage returns on the afore-
mentioned portfolios, REW , RVW , RTOP , RBOTTOM and R
IT
SP500, respectively. The descriptive
statistics are summarized in Table 2.
Over the sample period, the mean return on the value-weighted portfolio of pharmaceu-
tical stocks with time-varying weights (VW), 0.0549%, was considerably greater than the
mean of the remaining portfolios. The median follows a similar pattern with one notable
exception, where the difference between the mean and the median (and hence the ensuing
asymmetries in the probability density function) is largest for the EW portfolio. The range
of variation between the maximum and the minimum returns is greatest for the S&P500
IT portfolio (11.46% and −9.67%, respectively) and lowest for the VW portfolio (10.17%
and −6.52%, respectively). The BOTTOM portfolio has the highest idiosyncratic risk, as
measured by the standard deviation (1.63%), whereas the TOP portfolio is the least risky
to invest (1.03%). Moreover, portfolio returns are negatively skewed, with an exception of
the VW portfolio. The negative skewness implies that large negative returns are more likely
than large positive returns, whereas the converse is true for the positively skewed returns.
Furthermore, returns on the five portfolios are leptokurtic, where the coefficient of excess
16The equally weighted portfolio draws on the literature that studies the optimality of portfolios of na¨ıve
investors (De Miguel et al., 2009)
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Statistic EW VW TOP BOTTOM SP500IT
Mean (%) 0.0077 0.0549 0.0159 -0.0125 0.0366
Median (%) 0.0405 0.0586 0.0209 0.0000 0.0559
Maximum (%) 10.5582 10.1711 10.3673 8.2638 11.4610
Minimum (%) -7.1160 -6.5238 -7.7975 -11.2926 -9.6701
Std. Dev.(%) 1.2198 1.1391 1.0262 1.6259 1.3702
Skewness -0.3194 0.0210 -0.1041 -0.1746 -0.0439
Excess Kurt. 4.5993 4.6354 9.0512 2.6647 9.3379
Jarque-Bera 2782.39 2772.99 10577.2 931.996 5184.43
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Ljung-Box Q5 29.581 8.2820 24.890 12.497 21.378
(0.0000) (0.1414) (0.0001) (0.0286) (0.0007)
Ljung-Box Q25 1069.197 667.071 1260.68 167.730 802.233
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 3097 3097 3097 3097 3097
Notes: This table summarizes the descriptive statistics (mean, median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, ex-
cess kurtosis, the Jarque-Bera statistic, Ljung-Box test statistics for returns and returns squared) of continuously compounded
day-to-day percentage returns on five investment portfolios. EW denotes returns on an equally-weighted portfolio of phar-
maceutical stocks. VW denotes returns on a (time-varying) value-weighted portfolio of pharmaceutical stocks. TOP denotes
returns on a constant-value-weighted portfolio of 10 largest pharmaceutical firms. BOTTOM denotes returns on a constant-
value-weighted portfolio of 10 smallest pharmaceutical stocks. SP500IT denotes returns on the S&P Information Technology
stock index. Q5 denotes the Ljung-Box test statistic for the fifth-order cumulative autocorrelation of stock returns, and Q25
denotes the Ljung-Box test statistic for the fifth-order cumulative autocorrelation of returns squared. The p-values are provided
in round parentheses. The table also provides the p-values for the significance tests of the Jarque-Bera and Ljung-Box statistics.
We use daily data for the period 01/01/2003 – 11/13/2014 (a total of 3097 observations).
kurtosis is greater than zero. A high value of excess kurtosis contributes to the observed
non-normality of returns for the five portfolios, as measured by the Jarque-Bera test statis-
tic. The Ljung-Box test statistic provides evidence of serial correlation in (squared) returns.
Therefore, our regression-based methodology in Section 4.3 is designed so as to account for
heteroscedasticity.
4 Hypotheses and Methodology
4.1 Testable Hypotheses
This section outlines testable hypotheses for pharmaceutical stock returns around DRNs.
DRNs may give rise to two conflicting sentiment effects, the DRNs positive effect and the
fear effect. In this respect, Kaplanski and Levy (2012) document a “negative and significant
war sentiment effect” during the Yom Kippur war in Israel, and a positive and significant
“holiday sentiment effect”. Firstly, DRN may lead to anxiety, bad mood and pessimism
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among the general public and stock market investors, associated with a panic effect generated
by overemphasized media coverage of pandemic diseases. In this scenario, anxiety and fear
spread across different stock market sectors and may instigate a drop in the pharmaceutical
stock prices. Our first hypothesis predicts that the investor’s fear gauge, provoked by DRNs,
may lead to a decrease in rate of return on pharmaceutical companies’ stocks.
Hypothesis 1. DRNs may lead to bad mood among investors which negatively affects port-
folio returns of pharmaceutical stocks.
Secondly, globally dangerous diseases may be perceived by stock market investors as a
profitable investment opportunity. They unreasonably anticipate that a disease will trigger
an increase in R&D expenditure by pharmaceutical companies. This development generates
a positive sentiment and hence raises demand for pharmaceutical companies’ stocks. As a
result, portfolio valuation increases. Thus, our second hypothesis predicts a positive relation
between DRNs and returns on pharmaceutical stocks.
Hypothesis 2. DRNs have a positive effect on portfolio returns of pharmaceutical stocks.
Our third hypothesis underlies the assumption that investors initially underreact to an
announcement of a globally dangerous disease but they overreact thereafter, wherein the
degree of overreaction depends on the announcement’s relative salience as measured by media
coverage (Palomino et al., 2009). The larger is the information salience of an announcement
the faster the contents are incorporated into the share prices (Klibanoff et al., 1998). Within
the pharmaceutical industry, considerable media coverage can cause significant changes in
stock prices through continuous overreporting, even though no genuinely new information
becomes available to the market (Huberman and Regev, 2001). Thus, motivated by the
existing literature and the observed inflow of information around PHEIC alerts (see Figure
1), we further hypothesize that a positive sentiment of stock market investors can remain
significant after the event at an elevated level.
Hypothesis 3. DRNs have a persistent effect on portfolio returns of pharmaceutical stocks.
Such persistence is consistent with an inflow of disease-related information in the stock mar-
ket.
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Our fourth hypothesis builds on the notion that investor sentiment should affect more
strongly small stocks relative to large stocks (see, for instance, Brown and Cliff, 2005).
Therefore, we expect that on and after the event day, investor sentiment will be potentially
stronger for small pharmaceutical firms than for large firms. This hypothesis is supported
by recent studies suggesting that stocks of small firms are mainly held by local investors who
tend to be largely influenced by specific events (see also Edmans et al., 2007). Furthermore,
even though large pharmaceutical companies act as forerunners of R&D activities, it may be
less costly for small pharmaceuticals to act as followers in the development of new drugs.17
However, vaccine production requires more costly and sophisticated technologies than drug
production (Hinman et al., 2006). The cost of new vaccines places a constraint on small
pharmaceutical firms. As a result, they are likely to contribute to the development of new
vaccines less than large firms.
Hypothesis 4. DRNs have a greater effect on stock returns of small companies relative to
large companies.
Two commonly used – the event-study and regression-based – methodologies are used to
test the aforementioned hypotheses.
4.2 Event Study Methodology
In the spirit of traditional event studies, we begin our analysis by computing cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) around DRNs. The abnormal returns are defined as the difference
between the observed rate of return of a pharmaceutical portfolio and its ex-post expected
rate of return over the whole length of the event window. The expected rate of return
is estimated based on the Fama-French three-factor model18. We choose an event window
length to cover 14 days prior and 14 days after DRNs. The estimation window for the model
is 252 days long.
17Despite the well-documented first-mover advantage in the pharmaceutical industry, “under the current
law, the chemical formula and the efficacy of the cure as established by clinical trials are made available
for competitors essentially for free” (Boldrin and Levine (2013), Page 13). When patents expire, low-cost
generics are immediately introduced in the market.
18The daily data for the factors SMB, HML, and the excess return on the market were obtained from
Kenneth French’s website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french).
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In our sample, we observe temporal clustering of DRNs. This means that if all DRNs
were taken into account, the CARs would suffer from overlapping event windows. For this
reason, our CAR calculations include only a subset of all available DRNs. The DRNs are
selected according to the following two criteria. The first selection procedure, labelled LAST
EVENT, chooses a DRN only if it is not followed by other DRNs within 28 days after its
occurrence. FIRST EVENT, on the other hand, selects the DRNs in a chronological order.
It starts with the first DRN in the sample, ignores all DRNs showing up in the proximate
28 days, takes the next DRN in succession, ignores the following 28 days, and so on. This
iteration proceeds until the whole sample is exhausted.
For illustration, assume there are five DRNs taking place at dates τ0, τ1, τ2, τ3, and τ4
where τ1, τ2, and τ3 are temporally clustered. Then, LAST EVENT uses DRNs for CAR
calculation occurring on days τ0, τ3, and τ4 and FIRST EVENT chooses τ0, τ1, and τ4. The
top two panels in Figure 2 illustrate graphically these two simple examples.
4.3 Regression-Based Methodology
Following existing empirical studies (see Kamstra et al., 2003; Edmans et al., 2007; Kaplanski
and Levy, 2010a,b; Curatola et al., 2016), to evaluate the impact of DRNs on pharmaceutical
stock returns, and to identify the negative fear effect, we implement the following regression
model:
Rp,t = β0 +
5∑
i=1
β1,iRp,t−i +
4∑
i=1
β2,iDi,t + β3D
TAX
t + β4Et + β5FIt + up,t (1)
where Rp,t is the daily rate of return on a portfolio of pharmaceutical stocks p, β0 is the
regression intercept, Rp,t−i are lagged dependent variables. D1, D2, D3, D4 are dummy vari-
ables for Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, respectively, and DTAXt is a dummy
variable for the first five days of the taxation year. Further, Et represents the DRNs effect
variable, FIt denotes a fear index, and up,t is an error term. In line with existing studies,
the VIX is used to proxy the investment fear index also known as “investor fear gauge” (see
Whaley, 2009).19 Specifically, in the spirit of Bloom (2009), our fear indicator is a dummy
19We consider the VIX an adequate proxy as the correlation between the 252-days rolling standard devi-
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variable that takes on value 1 when the US stock-market volatility exceeds by more than
1.65 standard deviations the Hodrick-Prescott detrended (λ = 1600 ∗ (365/4)4) mean of the
stock-market volatility series (i.e., the raw VIX), and 0 otherwise.20
The coefficient β4 captures the contemporaneous effect of DRNs on the portfolio rate of
return. It should be noted that the majority of DRNs (85%) is published by the WHO which
is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. Due to different time zones, we assume that the
US stock market reacts on the day of DRNs publication. Further, previous days’ rates of
return, Rp,t−i, variables are embedded in our main regression to account for possible serial
correlation. We choose five lagged returns to be sure that all serial correlations have been
accounted for. The dummy variables for the days of the week are employed to account for
the so-called “Monday effect”.
To account for a possible positive sentiment effect on the days following DRNs, or differ-
ently, for a possible reversal effect, we run also the following regression:
Rp,t = β0 +
5∑
i=1
β1,iRp,t−i +
4∑
i=1
β2,iDi,t + β3D
TAX
t +
I∑
i=0
β4,iEt−i + β5FIt + up,t. (2)
5 Results
5.1 Event Study Methodology
Figure 2 depicts the CARs around the event date. The black solid (dashed) line illustrates
the LAST EVENT (FIRST EVENT) approach. The LAST EVENT approach gives rise to
positive abnormal returns following the event day for the EW and the BOTTOM portfolio.
The increase prior to the event can be attributed to the sensitivity of the LAST EVENT
approach to the contiguous (preceding) events in the overlapping window. The FIRST
EVENT approach points to an increase in returns of the EW and BOTTOM portfolios
on the event day. This increase is rather persistent on the days following the event, thus,
confirming that also those DRNs that were discarded in the CAR calculation had a positive
ation of the S&P 500 index and the pharma portfolios is rather high (average correlations are reported in
parentheses): EW (0.79), VW (0.72), TOP (0.82), BOTTOM (0.78).
20Notice that the fear effect FIt overlaps the sentiment effect generated by DRNs in 119 out of 146 cases.
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impact on pharmaceutical stock returns. The results are less supporting for the EW and
TOP portfolios. We stress that the event study results are weaker than the regression results
reported in the next section due to the fact that only 33 out of 146 DRNs were employed
in the CAR analysis. In general, EW LAST/FIRST (VW, TOP, BOTTOM) experienced in
27%/30.7% (34.6%/42.3%, 38.4%/42.3%, 53.8%/50%) of all event cases a significant CAR at
a 10% level. Still, our CAR analysis provides evidence supporting the persistent (positive)
sentiment effect hypothesis. One could anticipate that the SMB factor in the three-factor
Fama-French model already captures some of the effect of investment sentiment, biasing
the estimate of CARs. Indeed, if investors holding smaller stocks become more optimistic,
then the SMB factor increases, and the cumulative abnormal return decreases. We also
computed the CARs by employing the excess return on the market in a one-factor model.21
The unreported results suggest more pronounced CARs for the BOTTOM portfolio. Overall,
our event study analysis reveals a positive and persistent effect of DRNs on stock returns of
pharmaceutical companies.
5.2 Regression Analysis
Results examining the effect of the fear gauge and DRN on the pharmaceutical stock market
returns are reported in Table 3. Panel A documents our main findings that result from
incorporating all events in the regression analysis. For robustness purposes, we also rerun
our model on a subsample of DRNs by employing WHO-related announcements only (see
Panel B). Consistently with the Investor Fear Gauge Hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), a negative
and significant effect of the fear gauge index is obtained. This effect is robust across the five
portfolios. The estimated coefficient β5 ranges from -0.1378 (TOP portfolio) to -0.2056 (VW
portfolio). Thus, the effect of investor fear gauge is strongest for diversified portfolios of
stocks and weakest for large firms. Further, the DRNs variable effect is always positive and
generally significant at the 5% significance level, vindicating Hypothesis 2 (Positive Senti-
ment Hypothesis). The coefficient estimate ranges from 0.1781 (VW) to 0.3877 (BOTTOM).
Thus, in the wake of DRNs, stock returns increase within the range between 18 and 39 basis
21In the one-factor model, EW LAST/FIRST (VW, TOP, BOTTOM) experienced in 42.3%/42.3%
(46.1%/50%, 46.2%/50%, 53.9%/50%) of all event cases a significant CAR at a 10% level.
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Figure 2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Pharmaceutical Portfolios
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Notes: This figure depicts the average cumulative residuals around the event date (t = 0) for pharmaceutical portfolios EW,
VW, TOP, and BOTTOM . The residual on day t is calculated as the difference between observed rate of return and the ex-post
expected rate of return on day t. The three-factor model is rt = α + β1(rm,t − rf ) + β2smbt + β3hmlt + t, where rt is the
pharmaceutical portfolio return and rm,t − rf , smbt and hmlt are Fama-French factors. The estimation window is 252 days.
The solid (dashed) line represents the LAST (FIRST) EVENT approach when estimating the CARs. This ensures that event
windows are non-overlapping. The top two panels illustrate the two different estimation procedures graphically. The LAST
(FIRST) EVENT approach includes event days τ0, τ3 and τ4 (τ0, τ1 and τ4) in the estimation procedure. The events occurred
during a 12-year period (March 2003 to December 2014) which includes 33 event days with non-overlapping event windows.
points. This is an interesting finding, insofar as pandemic diseases, such as Ebola, may
not actually spread in the US. However, as suggested by existing studies, investor decisions
can be guided by sentiment. Paradoxically, while globally dangerous diseases may impose
non-negligible costs on the economy and may potentially lead to the depletion of resources,
DRNs can produce an optimistic view and a positive sentiment effect among stock market
investors located in the US. They unreasonably anticipate that pharmaceutical companies
whose stocks or ADRs are listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ will invest in R&D and, poten-
tially, raise their future cash flows. However, they overlook the fact that the patent system
is thought of to constrain investment and productivity growth in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry (Boldrin and Levine, 2013). At the same time, they underestimate the probability
that vaccines and medicines are not necessarily effective (Shortridge, 2004). The results
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unambiguously indicate that stock market investors should buy stocks when an outbreak of
a pandemic disease is announced. Moreover, investment in a relatively diversified portfolio
of stocks (such as EW or VW) when a pandemic disease is announced yields a lower return
than investment in a portfolio of small stocks (such as BOTTOM), ceteris paribus.22 This
finding supports Hypothesis 4 wherein small stocks respond more strongly to investor senti-
ment than large stocks. This result resonates well with Brown and Cliff (2005) and Edmans
et al. (2007).
Table 4 further shows that the investor fear gauge has the smallest (largest) effect (in
absolute value) for the TOP (VW) portfolio (-0.1481 and -0.2163, respectively). The investor
fear gauge reflects investor pessimism regarding portfolio investment, which has a negative
effect on stock prices and returns of pharmaceutical companies. This result confirms Hy-
pothesis 1, which predicts a negative relation between investor fear gauge and returns on
pharmaceutical companies’ stocks. It is qualitatively similar to results reported by Kaplan-
ski and Levy (2012), wherein the investor fear gauge provoked by the Yom Kippur war is
responsible for a negative effect on the stock market return of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.
Table 4 also indicates that the investor’s sentiment effect is positive and persistent. We use
six lags of DRNs to capture the persistence. We test the combined effect of the contem-
poraneous and lagged DRNs on pharmaceutical stock returns. To this end, we test for the
significance of the coefficient sum
∑I
i=0 β4,i. Entries related to this coefficient sum high-
light that the DRNs positive sentiment effect is stronger among small pharmaceutical firms
(0.8169) and is weaker for the value-weighted portfolio (0.4860). In all cases, the coefficient
is significant at 1% level. Results in Table 4 build on the assumption that the DRNs positive
sentiment effect will last for six trading days due to a continuous flow of information in the
stock market. Indeed, as suggested by Figure 1, the number of media articles remains above
average during six days in the aftermath of a PHEIC event. The estimated lagged effects
are also consistent with Kaplanski and Levy (2010b), who argue that the announcement
typically receives headlines several days after the event. The estimation results for the five
portfolios show a positive and significant effect (at the significance level of 5% or higher) for
22It should also be noted that either due to lower expenses related to sub-contracting (Assid et al., 2015)
or less costly imitation of larger pharmaceutical companies (Boldrin and Levine, 2013), small pharmaceutical
stocks can potentially generate higher returns than large stocks.
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at least six working days after DRNs is released. Thus, our results also support Hypothesis
3 (i.e., Persistent Sentiment Hypothesis), wherein the positive sentiment remains significant
several days after the DRNs. This result agrees with Huberman and Regev (2001) who un-
derscore the importance of the information salience of a breakthrough in bio-pharmaceutical
research. Taken together contemporaneous and lagged effects, there is unequivocal evidence
that DRNs has a positive and significant (either contemporaneous or lagged) effect on the
pharmaceutical stock prices.
Finally, it is worth noting that fear gauge and DRNs not only can provoke changes in the
pharmaceutical stock prices, but also in the S&P500 Information Technology stock index
– an industry unrelated to globally dangerous diseases – thus lending further support to
the investment sentiment effect. Specifically, our results indicate that fear gauge (DRNs)
has always a negative (positive) and significant effect on returns of the S&P500 Information
Technology stock index. This result shows that investor sentiment effect can be widespread
across various industries in the economy and lead to profitable trading strategies in the stock
market.
It is worth noting that our research findings were further validated by a number of
robustness checks. First, we sought to ascertain the extent to which investor sentiment
can spread to other sectors of the economy and even to other countries. In this regard,
the presence of investor sentiment was identified in the S&P500 Industrials portfolio – an
industry seemingly unrelated to globally dangerous diseases. The impact of fear gauge and
DRNs was also tested on regions that were directly affected by globally dangerous diseases.
In particular, the estimation results show a negative (positive) and significant effect of fear
gauge (DRNs) on returns on the MSCI Emerging Markets stock market index. Second,
to account for the presence of conditional heteroscedasticity in daily stock returns, our
regression methodology was extended to include a battery of GARCH specifications. As
in the benchmark methodology, results show a negative (positive) and significant effect of
fear gauge (DRN) on pharmaceutical stock return, endorsing the main findings. Third, as
a complementary exercise, we varied the number of lags in Eq. (2). The estimation results
broadly support Hypothesis 3. Fourth, we performed all our regressions excluding the control
variables (i.e., with the DRNs and fear gauge variables only). Again, the main findings
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can be upheld. The general conclusion that can be drawn from these robustness checks is
that investor sentiment, triggered by globally dangerous diseases, is neither confined to the
pharmaceutical industry nor is model specific. By contrast, the presence of investor sentiment
is robust to the type of activity, the geographical scope and the various methodological
underpinnings.23
23All the additional checks are not reported but are available from the authors upon request.
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6 Exploiting Sentiment and Fear Effects
Based on the empirical evidence reported in the previous sections, we assume that an investor
is willing to exploit both sentiment and fear effects in response to DRNs by reallocating her
wealth to pharmaceutical stocks. For this purpose, we consider a zero-cost strategy. On
event days that coincide with high-volatility periods, as measured by the fear index, the
zero-cost spread portfolio takes a 100% long position in one of the four above mentioned
pharmaceutical portfolios and a 100% short position in the VIX. We let the holding period
of the spread portfolio vary between one (1D) and three days (3D). To eliminate timing-
inconsistencies, the trade is initiated at closing prices of the event day. This procedure
ensures that no trade precedes a DRN publication on any given event day.24 Table 5 reports
the strategies’ average performance. In Panel A all DRNs are taken into account while Panel
B considers only the WHO-related subsample. The 1D strategy does not yield a significant
performance for all four pharmaceutical portfolios. Differently, a holding period of two or
three days is remarkably profitable. Such profitability is higher in the case of the EW and
BOTTOM portfolios.
The longer term profitability of overweighting pharmaceutical stocks and underweighting
the VIX is illustrated in Figure 3. Differently from the strategies presented in Table 6, we
assume in the following full exposure to the stock market. That is, during tranquil times
investor’s wealth is invested in the market portfolio, which is proxied by the S&P500. On
event days that coincide with high-volatility periods, the investor reallocates her funds by
going 150% long in a pharmaceutical portfolio and 50% short in the VIX index and holds her
position between one (1D) and three (3D) days. The depicted outperformance is calculated
as the difference between the cumulative performance of a trading strategy and the market
portfolio. A visual inspection suggests a similar performance between the VW and TOP
portfolios while EW and BOTTOM are the more profitable strategies for all three investment
horizons.
For robustness purposes, we ignore the fear effects and consider a simple buy-and-hold
24A more precise approach would involve the exact publication time of the news in a given country and
by taking into account the time zone difference between the US and the respective country. Unfortunately,
the majority of DRNs does not have a time stamp. Nevertheless, our trading strategy is consistent in timing
for those DRNs that are accompanied with an exact publication time.
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Table 5: Trading Strategy
PANEL A: (ALL DRNs)
EW VW TOP BOTTOM
1D 0.518 0.3755 0.4208 0.3941
(0.5208) (0.5085) (0.5036) (0.5226)
2D 1.6302** 1.2548** 1.2544** 1.4261**
(0.7754) (0.7551) (0.7386) (0.7592)
3D 1.913** 1.433** 1.4542** 1.9172***
(0.8539) (0.8076) (0.8006) (0.8063)
PANEL B: (WHO Disease Outbreak News + WHO Statements)
EW VW TOP BOTTOM
1D 0.4991 0.3831 0.4181 0.424
(0.5725) (0.5618) (0.5555) (0.5877)
2D 1.6275** 1.2644* 1.2491* 1.3749*
(0.8505) (0.8368) (0.8174) (0.8572)
3D 2.0802** 1.6035** 1.6335** 2.1461**
(0.9783) (0.9301) (0.9224) (0.9296)
Notes: This table presents the average performance (in %, standard deviations are in parentheses) of a spread portfolio that
is invested 100% long in a pharmaceutical portfolio and 100% short in VIX. Long and short positions are taken only during
high-volatility states of the world (as indicated by the Fear Index) and using closing prices of the DRN day. The holding
period of the portfolio varies between one (1D) and three days (3D). In Panel A the trading strategy is based on all DRNs. In
Panel B the trading strategy is based on WHO Disease Outbreak News and WHO Statements only. The trading period runs
from January 2003 to November 2014 (3097 trading days). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote
significance of a two-tailed t-Test at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
strategy that initiates a long position in a pharmaceutical portfolio at the closing prices of
an event day and holds it for 14 days. The unreported results confirm that also this strategy
would have yielded a positive outperformance over the market.25
Overall, we find that investment strategies exploiting sentiment and fear effect related
to DRNs lead to higher profitability. Once again, this result is most pronounced for the
BOTTOM portfolio confirming that sentiment tends to have a greater effect on small stocks.
25The EW (VW, TOP, BOTTOM) portfolio has on average a 1.6% (0.7%, 0.3%, 1.7%) higher performance
than the S&P500 during a 14 day period.
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Figure 3: Outperformance of DRNs and Fear Effects Strategies
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Notes: This figure depicts the outperformance of portfolios that follow DRNs-based trading strategies. The strategies initiate
a 150% long position in a pharmaceutical portfolio (using closing prices of the DRN day) and a 50% short position in the VIX
on those event dates that coincide with high-volatility states of the world as indicated by the Fear Index. During tranquil
times (i.e., absence of DRN), the trading portfolio is invested 100% in the S&P500. The holding period of the strategies varies
between one (Panel 1D) and three days (Panel 3D). The outperformance is calculated as the difference between the cumulative
performance of the four trading portfolios and a long-only position in the market portfolio that is proxied by S&P500. Assuming
an initial investment of U$ 1, the application of the trading strategies 1D–3D to EW (VW, TOP, BOTTOM) yields on average
between USD 0.48–2.05 (0.22–0.67, 0.24–0.66, 0.29–2.02) more than a long-only market exposure. The trading period runs from
January 2003 to November 2014 (3097 trading days).
7 Concluding remarks
Motivated by the abundance of recent behavioral finance studies showing that particular
events (e.g., St. Patrick Day, Yom Kippur War, Rosh Hashanah, International Sporting
Games) may have a strong effect on investors’ mood, this paper tests whether DRNs have a
significant positive sentiment effect among investors interested in US pharmaceutical compa-
nies and, thus, on their stock prices. This research builds on the notion that vaccine produc-
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tion for globally dangerous diseases is concentrated in a few large pharmaceutical companies.
Indeed, the number of vaccine producers in the U.S. decreased dramatically from the sixties
– in 1967 there were 37 vaccine producers (Masignani et al., 2003) – to just over a dozen in
2016. Rational investors design trading strategies that are based on expectations of future
cash flows of these companies. We argue that rational trading should not occur because
of two reasons. First, in the wake of DRNs, uncertainty surrounding distant cash flows of
vaccine developers may be too high. Second, resources available for smaller pharmaceutical
companies may be too limited to engage in large-scale R&D. For instance, it is required to
invest at least USD 850 million to license a new pharmaceutical product (Masignani et al.,
2003). As a result, pharmaceutical stock prices should not respond to DRNs. Thus, DRNs
can only lead to higher stock prices and returns of other pharmaceutical companies through
altering investor sentiment about their future performance and leading to irrational trad-
ing (see also Kaplanski and Levy, 2010b). The potential negative sentiment effect induced
by fear and anxiety due to DRNs is also tested, allowing us to account for two conflicting
sentiment effects.
Our findings are as follows. First, we observe that DRNs exert a positive and significant
effect on pharmaceutical firms’ stock returns. This effect is relatively stronger for a portfolio
of small stocks. We further observe that the DRN effect lasts for several days. Based on
the assumption that a DRN can also generate panic, fear and anxiety among international
investors, we observe that an ad hoc fear gauge index appears to exert a negative and
significant effect on returns of pharmaceutical companies’ stocks. Again, the effect is stronger
for small relative to large stocks.
Overall, this research shows that optimism and pessimism – induced by DRNs – can
significantly influence portfolio investment decisions in the pharmaceutical industry. Our
findings are of utmost importance and practical usefulness for institutional and individual
investors, portfolio managers, financial analysts and pharmaceutical firms. Indeed, we iden-
tify a range of exploitable investment opportunities. To this end, we design a number of
trading strategies that involve a portfolio of pharmaceutical stocks and the VIX volatility
index.
The results of the exercise unambiguously show that trading strategies yield positive and
28
significant returns. The outcome of this exercise is also useful for portfolio managers who
formulate a professional and qualified advice for investors. Financial analysts can provide a
comprehensive analysis of investment opportunities in the pharmaceutical sector. Further-
more, by issuing and selling new stocks to investors, pharmaceutical firms can benefit from
increasing market valuation and, hence, from lower cost fundings for R&D spending when a
global disease breaks out and accelerates.
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APPENDIX
A Data
NO NAME MCAP CAP WEIGHT CUM SUM 1 CUM SUM 2
1 PFIZER 188593.1946 15.5172 15.5172 100.0000
2 JOHNSON & JOHNSON 180892.8180 14.8836 30.4008 84.4828
3 GLAXOSMITHKLINE 124710.2614 10.2610 40.6617 69.5992
4 MERCK & COMPANY 114423.0361 9.4146 50.0763 59.3383
5 ABBOTT LABORATORIES 73520.9544 6.0492 56.1255 49.9237
6 ASTRAZENECA 71562.0971 5.8880 62.0135 43.8745
7 AMGEN 68315.0835 5.6209 67.6344 37.9865
8 ELI LILLY 62379.5576 5.1325 72.7669 32.3656
9 BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB 61626.7479 5.0706 77.8374 27.2331
10 GILEAD SCIENCES 35021.1338 2.8815 80.7189 22.1626
11 NOVO NORDISK 34284.6745 2.8209 83.5398 19.2811
12 TEVA PHARM.INDS 28821.6231 2.3714 85.9112 16.4602
13 BIOGEN IDEC 20895.2112 1.7192 87.6304 14.0888
14 ALLERGAN 17904.0011 1.4731 89.1035 12.3696
15 GENZYME 14939.5048 1.2292 90.3327 10.8965
16 FOREST LABS 13182.6281 1.0846 91.4174 9.6673
17 VALEANT 9007.8462 0.7412 92.1585 8.5826
18 ACTAVIS 7885.8495 0.6488 92.8074 7.8415
19 ELAN 7077.8720 0.5824 93.3897 7.1926
20 MYLAN 6572.2429 0.5408 93.9305 6.6103
21 ALEXION PHARMS 6338.2386 0.5215 94.4520 6.0695
22 SIGMA ALDRICH 5935.0372 0.4883 94.9403 5.5480
23 VERTEX PHARMS 5909.6323 0.4862 95.4265 5.0597
24 REGENERON PHARMS 5319.3428 0.4377 95.8642 4.5735
25 PERRIGO 4580.8478 0.3769 96.2411 4.1358
26 CEPHALON 4198.4394 0.3454 96.5866 3.7589
27 AMYLIN PHARMS 2882.0073 0.2371 96.8237 3.4134
28 IDEXX LABORATORIES 2858.6592 0.2352 97.0589 3.1763
29 OSI PHARMS. 2295.2012 0.1888 97.2477 2.9411
30 ONYX PHARMS. 2212.3014 0.1820 97.4298 2.7523
31 NBTY DEAD 2154.6428 0.1773 97.6070 2.5702
32 BIO-TECHNE 2134.9189 0.1757 97.7827 2.3930
33 PDL BIOPHARMA 1658.8950 0.1365 97.9192 2.2173
34 CUBIST PHARMACEUTICALS 1521.3011 0.1252 98.0444 2.0808
35 PHARMACYCLICS 1377.5567 0.1133 98.1577 1.9556
36 IMMUCOR DEAD 1200.8945 0.0988 98.2565 1.8423
37 ISIS PHARMACEUTICALS 1113.6985 0.0916 98.3482 1.7435
38 PAR PHARMACEUTICAL COS. 1078.8536 0.0888 98.4369 1.6518
39 NEKTAR THERAPEUTICS 1074.3753 0.0884 98.5253 1.5631
40 CHATTEM DEAD 1023.8235 0.0842 98.6096 1.4747
41 VIROPHARMA DEAD 945.5819 0.0778 98.6874 1.3904
42 MARTEK BIOSCIENCES DEAD 906.6911 0.0746 98.7620 1.3126
43 QUESTCOR PHARMS. 857.4462 0.0705 98.8325 1.2380
44 QLT (NAS) 850.3269 0.0700 98.9025 1.1675
45 NPS PHARMACEUTICALS 793.5564 0.0653 98.9678 1.0975
46 ENZON PHARMS. 699.0431 0.0575 99.0253 1.0322
47 MERIDIAN BIOSCIENCE 583.7499 0.0480 99.0733 0.9747
48 USANA HEALTH SCIENCES 524.6496 0.0432 99.1165 0.9267
49 IMMUNOGEN 523.7035 0.0431 99.1596 0.8835
50 CAMBREX 518.7217 0.0427 99.2022 0.8404
51 VIVUS 485.4240 0.0399 99.2422 0.7978
52 NEOGEN 472.8012 0.0389 99.2811 0.7578
53 QUIDEL 396.0453 0.0326 99.3137 0.7189
54 GERON 392.1340 0.0323 99.3459 0.6863
55 CTI BIOPHARMA 354.9887 0.0292 99.3751 0.6541
56 AMAG PHARMACEUTICALS 354.7572 0.0292 99.4043 0.6249
57 AMARIN 353.9426 0.0291 99.4335 0.5957
58 CELLDEX THERAPEUTICS 339.2544 0.0279 99.4614 0.5665
59 ASTEX PHARMACEUTICALS 328.9040 0.0271 99.4884 0.5386
33
60 ORASURE TECHS. 323.2983 0.0266 99.5150 0.5116
61 XOMA 312.4535 0.0257 99.5407 0.4850
62 PROGENICS PHARMS. 311.1469 0.0256 99.5663 0.4593
63 SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS 270.2514 0.0222 99.5886 0.4337
64 CERUS 269.7842 0.0222 99.6108 0.4114
65 NOVAVAX 261.0639 0.0215 99.6323 0.3892
66 FLAMEL TECHS. 252.9481 0.0208 99.6531 0.3677
67 HI-TECH PHML. 230.6911 0.0190 99.6720 0.3469
68 BIOCRYST PHARMS. 227.5715 0.0187 99.6908 0.3280
69 DEPOMED 218.5011 0.0180 99.7087 0.3092
70 ARQULE 211.1096 0.0174 99.7261 0.2913
71 SCICLONE PHARMS. 192.3768 0.0158 99.7419 0.2739
72 VICAL 191.0992 0.0157 99.7577 0.2581
73 PEREGRINE PHARMS. 191.0939 0.0157 99.7734 0.2423
74 ARCA BIOPHARMA 177.9806 0.0146 99.7880 0.2266
75 ONCOTHYREON (NAS) 163.0754 0.0134 99.8015 0.2120
76 TRINITY BIOTECH 161.7711 0.0133 99.8148 0.1985
77 DISCOVERY LABORATORIES 160.3241 0.0132 99.8280 0.1852
78 REPLIGEN 156.1896 0.0129 99.8408 0.1720
79 ANIKA THERAPEUTICS 131.3024 0.0108 99.8516 0.1592
80 SIGA TECHNOLOGIES 130.3700 0.0107 99.8623 0.1484
81 DUSA PHARMACEUTICALS 124.5980 0.0103 99.8726 0.1377
82 CASI PHARMACEUTICALS 121.1209 0.0100 99.8826 0.1274
83 THERAGENICS 117.7449 0.0097 99.8922 0.1174
84 REPROS THERAPEUTICS 101.2414 0.0083 99.9006 0.1078
85 LA JOLLA PHARM. 100.3018 0.0083 99.9088 0.0994
86 ONCOGENEX PHARMS. 99.5011 0.0082 99.9170 0.0912
87 HEMISPHERX BIOPHARMA 99.2742 0.0082 99.9252 0.0830
88 GTC BIOTH. 96.8866 0.0080 99.9332 0.0748
89 PONIARD PHARMS. 90.9323 0.0075 99.9406 0.0668
90 CYTRX 84.8427 0.0070 99.9476 0.0594
91 AASTROM BIOSCIENCES 84.6644 0.0070 99.9546 0.0524
92 HARBOR DIVERSIFIED 74.8975 0.0062 99.9607 0.0454
93 AMPLIPHI BIOSCIENCES 74.3217 0.0061 99.9669 0.0393
94 PALATIN TECHS. 66.2649 0.0055 99.9723 0.0331
95 OXIGENE 64.4941 0.0053 99.9776 0.0277
96 HESKA 56.3439 0.0046 99.9823 0.0224
97 UNITED GUARDIAN 54.0690 0.0044 99.9867 0.0177
98 PROPHASE LABS 52.6426 0.0043 99.9910 0.0133
99 IGI LABORATORIES 39.7254 0.0033 99.9943 0.0090
100 NATURAL ALTS.INTL. 39.0276 0.0032 99.9975 0.0057
101 CYANOTECH 19.0884 0.0016 99.9991 0.0025
102 IMMUCELL 11.1632 0.0009 100.0000 0.0009
Table A.1: Pharmaceutical Companies
Note: In this table, pharmaceutical companies are sorted on market capitalization (in millions of USD) (column MCAP).
Market capitalization shares for each company are reported in column CAP WEIGHT. Columns CUM SUM 1 accumulates
capitalization. The last column shows capitalization shares in reverse order, i.e., the overall capitalization attributed to the
remaining firms, once the largest firms are accounted for.
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